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NOTES
EMPLOYEES' RECOVERY OF ATTORNEYS' FEES FROM
UNIONS UNDER SECTION 301 OF THE LABOR
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT
INTRODUCTION
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act' permits an em-
ployee to bring an action in state or federal court against an employer
who allegedly has violated a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA").2
Because most CBAs give the employee's labor union exclusive power to
challenge the employer's conduct,3 courts generally refuse to entertain
individual employee claims on the ground that such claims usurp union
power.' Courts, however, will hear the employee's case if the union has
abused this power by unfairly refusing to represent the employee 5 or by
representing the employee inadequately.6 Courts have read section 301
to provide a mechanism called a "hybrid" section 301/duty of fair repre-
sentation action7 for such situations. Under the hybrid action, the em-
ployee sues the employer for violating the CBA and sues the union for
breaching its duty of fair representation.'
1. Ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136, 156 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982)).
2. Section 301(a) provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
Act, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to
the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
Id. See also Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 183-84 (1967) (courts are not preempted by
National Labor Relations Board jurisdiction); Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co.,
369 U.S. 95, 101-04 (1962) (state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction, but
states must follow federal law).
3. See, e.g., Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212, 216 & n.5 (1983);
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 175 n.3, 185 (1967); Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379
U.S. 650, 660 & n.2 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting); see also Tidwell, Major Issues in the
Duty of Fair Representation Cases Since 1977, 62 U. Det. L. Rev. 383, 384 (1985)
("Under most collective bargaining agreements, unions have the exclusive right to pro-
cess, settle, and arbitrate grievances.").
4. See Republic Steel Corp., 379 U.S. at 653 ("employee must afford the union the
opportunity to act on his behalf").
5. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 192 (1967) (union did not "breach its duty of fair
representation, and thereby open up a suit by the employee for breach of contract");
Seymour v. Olin Corp., 666 F.2d 202, 207 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (union cannot refuse to
pursue grievance merely because employee sought to consult with private attorney); Del
Casal v. Eastern Airlines, 634 F.2d 295, 301 (5th Cir. Unit B Jan.) (union cannot con-
sider employee's non-union status in decision not to provide assistance of staff attorney),
cer denied, 454 U.S. 892 (1981).
6. See infra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
7. See DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 165 (1983);
Bagsby v. Lewis Bros., Inc., 820 F.2d 799, 799 (6th Cir. 1987).
8. A hybrid action arises when the employee brings both claims simultaneously. See
DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 165. While the Labor Management Relations Act only expressly
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When an employer has discharged an employee in what the employee
believes to be a violation of the CBA,9 the employee initially relies upon
his union to represent him, since most CBAs give the union the exclusive
power to challenge the employer. 0 If the union refuses to represent
him,'1 or does so inadequately, 2 the employee may challenge the union
under its constitution.I3 More likely, however, the employee commences
a hybrid action, primarily in the hope of receiving reinstatement and lost
wages. 4 To succeed, the employee must prove the union's breach of its
duty of fair representation 5 before the court will review the employer's
conduct under the CBA.' 6 If, after proving the union's breach, the em-
ployee also proves that the employer violated the CBA, the court will
order the employer to reinstate the employee and pay damages consisting
of lost wages through the date on which the dispute would have been
resolved had the union fulfilled its duty. "7 For the union's breach of its
grants federal jurisdiction for claims under the CBA, the Supreme Court has held that
§ 301 implicitly includes jurisdiction for duty of fair representation claims against the
union because of the intricate relationship that exists between the two claims. See id.;
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 183-84 (1967).
9. A recent study revealed that 56.6% of hybrid actions assert wrongful discharge,
16.4% involve seniority disputes, 7.4% allege employment discrimination, 6.4% involve
pay disputes, 4.6% raise pension or fringe benefit disputes, 4.1% assert an improper
change in working conditions, and 2.0% allege improper discipline, short of discharge.
See Goldberg, The Duty of Fair Representation: What the Courts Do in Fact, 34 Buffalo L.
Rev. 89, 134 (1985). For the purposes of discussion, this Note assumes the circumstances
surrounding allegations of wrongful discharge.
10. See supra note 3.
11. See, e.g., infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., infra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
13. The union constitution, which governs union-member relations, may require
union members to challenge the union through an internal appeals process. This chal-
lenge usually entails an appeal to the local union, then to the international union, and, if
necessary, to a public review board comprised of impartial non-union members. See, e.g.,
Clayton v. International Union, UAW, 451 U.S. 679, 682-83 (1981).
If the union constitution does not include an appeal provision, the employee may sue
the union. If he challenges the union's conduct without alleging a CBA violation, federal
courts have jurisdiction for such suits, not under § 301, but under 28 U.S.C. § 1337
(1982). Section 1337 grants federal courts jurisdiction over suits arising under congres-
sional acts regulating commerce. Id. See In re Carter, 618 F.2d 1093, 1104 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 949 (1981).
14. See, e.g., Clayton v. International Union, UAW, 451 U.S. 679, 690 (1981); United
Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 61 (1981); Ellenbogen v. Rider Maint. Corp.,
794 F.2d 768, 769 (2d Cir. 1986).
15. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967) (unions have a duty not to act arbi-
trarily, discriminatorily, or in bad faith).
16. See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 567 (1976); Vaca, 386
U.S. at 186; Cote v. Eagle Stores, Inc., 688 F.2d 32, 35 (7th Cir. 1982) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1218 (1983); Findley v. Jones Motor Freight, 639 F.2d 953, 958 (3d Cir.
1981). If the union has not breached its duty, courts will defer to the mechanism for
private resolution contained in the CBA, thereby avoiding review of the employer's con-
duct. See Hines, 424 U.S. at 567 (Court refused such deference because union's breach
"seriously undermine[d] the integrity of the arbitral process"); see also Findley, 639 F.2d
at 961 (on appeal, the circuit court reversed the lower court judgments against both union
and employer when it found no breach of union's duty).
17. See Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212, 215, 230 & n.19 (1983).
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duty of fair representation, the court will order the union to pay as dam-
ages that portion of lost wages attributable to the period running from
the end of the employer's liability to the resolution of the hybrid action,"
plus the attorney's fees incurred by the employee in his suit against the
employer.19 Thus, when the employee proves both a breach of the duty
of fair representation and a violation of the CBA, the employee receives
full compensation.20
Courts currently disagree, however, on whether to allow recovery of
attorney's fees for a union's breach of its duty of fair representation in the
absence of a CBA violation by an employer.21 Those that allow such
18. See idL at 215, 230 & n.19; Bowman v. TVA, 744 F.2d 1207, 1215 (6th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985); Pitts v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 700 F.2d 330, 334 (6th Cir.
1983).
In Bowen, the Supreme Court noted that damages to the employee initially resulted
from improper discharge by the employer but later were aggravated by the union's
breach. See id at 223. Thus, the Court divided the back pay liability award between the
employer and the union.
Prior to Bowen, the union's liability for damages was limited to court costs, attorney's
fees, and other litigation costs. See, eg., Seymour v. Olin Corp., 666 F.2d 202, 215 (5th
Cir. Unit B 1982); Milstead v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local Union No. 957,
649 F.2d 395, 396 (6th Cir.) (per curiam), cerL denied, 454 U.S. 896 (1981); see also De
Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281, 289-90 (1st Cir.) ("en-
tire amount of lost earnings... properly charged to the [employer]"), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 877 (1970).
Commentators have criticized the Bowen decision as making unions responsible for
damages caused by employers. See Aaron, Rights of Individual Employees Under the Ac!,
in American Labor Policy 119, 138 (C. Morris ed. 1987); Lansing & Peters, Bowen v.
United States Postal Service- The Duty of Fair Representation Becomes a Burden, 2 Hof-
stra Lab. L.J. 123, 150-54 (1984).
19. See infra note 70. The American rule against recovery of attorney's fees by a
prevailing litigant in the absence of statutory or contractual authorization, see Arcambel
v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796), would normally preclude an employee's claim
for attorney's fees incurred in his suit against the union. This rule, like most, has its
exceptions, and courts may exercise equitable power to award attorney's fees when justice
so requires. See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1973). Courts have made such an excep-
tion to the American rule in duty of fair representation cases. See Emmanuel v. Omaha
Carpenters Dist. Council, 560 F.2d 382, 385 (8th Cir. 1977); Harrison v. United Transp.
Union, 530 F.2d 558, 564 (4th Cir. 1975), cerL denied, 425 U.S. 958 (1976).
In addition, an employee's claim against his union for attorney's fees incurred in his
suit against his employer can be thought of as an ordinary claim for damages and, there-
fore, does not fall within the purview of the American rule. See Scott v. Local Union
377, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 548 F.2d 1244, 1246 (6th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 968 (1977); infra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., Zuniga v. United Can Co., 812 F.2d 443, 451-52, 455 (9th Cir. 1987)
(employee collected wrongfully-denied sick leave benefits from employer and attorney's
fees from union); Milstead v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local Union No. 957, 649
F.2d 395, 396 (6th Cir.) (per curiam) (employee settled with employer after jury verdict
in his favor and collected attorney's fees from union), cerL denied, 454 U.S. 896 (1981);
Scott, 548 F.2d at 1245-46 (employee collected $12,500 from employer plus attorney's
fees from union).
Of course, "full" compensation does not entail recovery of the attorney's fees incurred
in a suit against the union; they fall under the American rule. See supra note 19.
21. Compare Dutrisac v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 749 F.2d 1270, 1275-76 (9th Cir.
1983) (allowing recovery of attorney's fees in the absence of CBA violation by employer)
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recovery recognize that the union's breach causes distinct harm to the
employee, regardless of the outcome of his claim against the employer,
and argue that damages should be apportioned according to liability.22
Courts that deny such recovery hold that the employee's two claims are
inextricably interdependent; to prevail against either the employer or the
union, the employee must prove both a breach of the union's duty of fair
representation and a violation of the CBA.2 3
Part I of this Note considers a union's duty of fair representation, its
origin and its scope. Part I also examines the role of the union's duty as
a threshold question in hybrid actions and the rationale underlying such
a requirement. Part II focuses on the competing arguments relating to
whether recovery of attorney's fees should be allowed for a union's
breach absent an employer's violation and concludes that courts should
allow such recovery.
I. THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
A. Origin and Scope
The unions' duty of fair representation has its genesis in the Railway
Labor Act ("RLA").24 The RLA grants statutory authority to bargain-
ing representatives to represent all members of a collective bargaining
unit." The RLA also implies a concomitant duty to exercise this author-
and Self v. Drivers, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers Local Union No. 61, 620 F.2d
439, 444 (4th Cir. 1980) (same) with Wood v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 406,
807 F.2d 493, 503 (6th Cir. 1986) (denying recovery of attorney's fees in absence of CBA
violation by employer), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3232 (1987) and Foster v. United Steel-
workers, Local 13600, 752 F.2d 1533, 1534 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (same).
22. See infra notes 64, 69 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 77-78, 82 and accompanying text.
24. Ch. 691, 48 Stat. 1185 (1934) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-64
(1982)).
25. Section 2 of the RLA, in relevant part, provides: "Employees shall have the right
to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing. The
majority of any craft or class of employees shall have the right to determine who shall be
the representative of the craft or class for the purposes of this Act." Id. at 1187. While
the bargaining representative is often a labor union, it need not be. Cf. 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(c)(1)(A) (1982) (employee can petition the National Labor Relations Board to
decertify the "individual or labor organization, which has been certified ... as the bar-
gaining representative").
Similarly, when a labor union acts as the collective bargaining representative, the rep-
resented employees often are members of that union, but need not be. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 164(b) (1982); Del Casal v. Eastern Airlines, 634 F.2d 295, 297, 300-01 (5th Cir. Unit B
Jan.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 892 (1981); Tobias, The Plaintiff's View of "301-DFR" Liti-
gation, 5 Emp. Rel. L.J. 510, 515 (1980). If, for example, an employee's religion prevents
union membership, see 29 U.S.C. § 169 (1982), or he lives in a "right-to-work" state, the
employee need not be a member of the union. See Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. North-
western Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 537 (1949) (upholding Nebraska and North
Carolina laws that outlawed required union membership). Labor leaders term these non-
union members of the collective baragining unit "free riders" because they do not pay
union dues but receive the same benefits as those who do. See W. Gould, A Primer on
American Labor Law 50-51 (2d ed. 1986). Thus, unions often negotiate a "union secur-
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ity "without hostile discrimination [based on the employee's union mem-
bership or race], fairly, impartially, and in good faith."26
Although this duty of fair representation initially applied only to the
negotiation of CBAs,2 7 the Supreme Court subsequently demonstrated
that a union's duty included the administration of CBAs as well.2 As a
result, while unions have the authority to sift out wholly frivolous griev-
ances against the employer, they must represent union members in griev-
ance proceedings honestly and without arbitrary discrimination.29 Ways
in which unions have breached their duty of fair representation in the
administration of CBAs include refusing to pursue an employee's griev-
ance because of the employee's race 30 or lack of union membership, 3'
ity clause" that requires workers to pay periodic dues and initiation fees as a condition of
employment. See id at 50.
26. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944). In Steele, the exclusive
bargaining representative of all locomotive firemen breached its duty of fair representa-
tion under the RLA by negotiating and entering into a CBA with the employer that set
quotas for blacks. See id. at 203; see also Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Fire-
men, 323 U.S. 210, 213 (1944) (companion case holding that federal courts have jurisdic-
tion to hear non-diversity suit).
The Supreme Court soon extended this duty as developed under the RLA to represent-
atives certified under § 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), ch. 372, 49
Stat. 449, 453 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982)). See Ford Motor
Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953). While the Court recognized that it must allow
a bargaining representative a wide range of reasonableness in serving the unit it repre-
sents, the union's conduct is "subject always to complete good faith and honesty of pur-
pose in the exercise of its discretion." Id
Today, courts use the duty of fair representation as developed under the RLA and
NLRA virtually interchangeably. See Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargain-
ing Agreement, 61 Calif. L. Rev. 663, 676-718 (1973); VanderVelde, A Fair Process Model
for the Union's Fair Representation Duty, 67 Minn. L. Rev. 1079, 1091 n.29 (1983).
27. See Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 203 (1944).
28. See Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 350 (1964) (holding that union had met
its duty in representing seniority rights of employees at joint employer-employee commit-
tee meeting); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (holding that union could not
discriminate unfairly against blacks in its refusal to process grievances).
29. See Humphrey, 375 U.S. at 349-50. In the landmark case of Vaca v. Sipes, 386
U.S. 171 (1967), the Supreme Court set forth a broad, tripartite standard for determining
whether a union has breached its duty in administration. See id. at 190. Under the Vaca
test, a union breaches its duty of fair representation when its "conduct toward a member
of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith." Id.
Commentators disagree over whether the Vaca test applies to a union's duty in negotia-
tion. Compare Summers, The Individual Employee's Rights Under the Collective Agree-
ment What Constitutes Fair Representation?, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 251, 259 (1977)
(asserting that Vaca Court distinguished between negotiation and administration) with
Harper & Lupu, Fair Representation As Equal Protection, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1212, 1260-61
(1985) (positing that the Vaca decision left open the question whether the union's duty in
negotiation differs from that in administration) and Levine & Hollander, The Union's
Duty of Fair Representation in Contract Administration, 7 Emp. Rel. L.J. 193, 198 (1981)
(same).
30. See Peterson v. Lehigh Valley Dist. Council, 676 F.2d 81, 87 (3d Cir. 1982); Jen-
nings v. American Postal Workers Union, 672 F.2d 712, 716 (8th Cir. 1982). In cases of
racial discrimination, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1982),
provides another avenue of relief. See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Com-
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improperly investigating an employee's grievance,32  inadequately
presenting a grievance, 33 and trading different employee claims.34
Despite the many ways in which a union may breach its duty35 and the
various standards against which courts judge union conduct, 36 employees
munity Org., 420 U.S. 50, 70 (1975); Bugg v. International Union of Allied Indus. Work-
ers, Local 507, 674 F.2d 595, 597 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 805 (1982).
31. See Del Casal v. Eastern Airlines, 634 F.2d 295, 301 (5th Cir. Unit B Jan.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 892 (1981); Richardson v. Communications Workers, 443 F.2d 974, 982
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 818 (1971).
32. See Castelli v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 752 F.2d 1480, 1483 (9th Cir. 1985)
(although requisite degree of thoroughness varies with each situation, union must con-
duct some investigation before deciding whether or how to present grievance). For spe-
cific examples of improper investigations, see Tenorio v. NLRB, 680 F.2d 598, 602 (9th
Cir. 1982) (breach occurred when union declined to arbitrate without interviewing dis-
charged employees); Hughes v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 683, 554
F.2d 365, 368-69 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (reversing summary judgment for union
because union possibly breached duty by performing only perfunctory interview with em-
ployee before deciding not to arbitrate); De Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packing-
house, 425 F.2d 281, 284 (1st Cir.) (failure to conduct any investigation was arbitrary,
thus constituting breach of union's duty), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970).
33. See, e.g., Milstead v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local Union No. 957, 580
F.2d 232, 235-36 (6th Cir. 1978) (union breached by failing to present a critical fact at
grievance hearing), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 896 (1981); Griffin v. UAW, 469 F.2d 181, 184
(4th Cir. 1972) (union acted arbitrarily by presenting employee's grievance to supervisor
with whom employee had had a fist fight rather than to more objective depot manager).
A union's failure to raise every issue or call every witness, however, does not necessarily
constitute a breach of its duty. See Findley v. Jones Motor Freight, 639 F.2d 953, 959
(3d Cir. 1981) (failure to call witness who would have refused to testify not a breach);
Cannon v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 524 F.2d 290, 294 (7th Cir. 1975) (given all
circumstances, union's failure to raise particular issue was not a breach).
34. See Buchholtz v. Swift & Co., 609 F.2d 317, 327 (8th Cir. 1979) (union may not
trade claims in bad faith), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1018 (1980); Harrison v. United Transp.
Union, 530 F.2d 558, 560 (4th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (employer arranged for another
employee to be reinstated on the condition that union did not pursue plaintiff-employee's
grievance), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 958 (1976).
35. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
36. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967). Vaca holds that unions breach the
duty of fair representation by acting arbitrarily, discriminatorily, or in bad faith. Id.
Although courts can determine relatively easily whether a union has acted in bad faith or
discriminatorily, see, e.g., cases cited supra notes 30-31, the determination of "arbitrari-
ness" has proved more difficult.
The various standards play an instrumental role in deciding whether to allow recovery
of attorney's fees without a violation of CBA: the higher a court's standard for union
liability, the more egregious the union's conduct must be before the duty is breached, and
the more compelling the argument must be in favor of such recovery. While a full discus-
sion of the various interpretations of "arbitrariness" extends beyond the scope of this
Note, an abbreviated discussion follows.
Several courts require a finding of gross negligence before holding that the union, by
acting arbitrarily, has violated its duty of fair representation. See Poole v. Budd Co., 706
F.2d 181, 184 (6th Cir. 1983); Wyatt v. Interstate & Ocean Transp. Co., 623 F.2d 888,
891 (4th Cir. 1980); Robesky v. Qantas Empire Airways, Ltd., 573 F.2d 1082, 1089-90
(9th Cir. 1978). But see Dutrisac v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 749 F.2d 1270, 1273-74 (9th
Cir. 1983) (ordinary negligence can be arbitrary and breach duty of fair representation if
individual interest at stake is strong and union's failure to perform a ministerial act com-
pletely extinguishes employee's right to pursue claim).
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit equates arbitrariness with intentional
[Vol. 56
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generally find it difficult to prove a union breach. 7 Courts render the
employee's task even more difficult when, in an effort to avoid interfer-
ence in union-employee relations, they require the employee to exhaust
the union's internal grievance procedures before allowing the employee
to pursue a hybrid action in federal court.38 Courts exercise discretion in
this area,39 however, and may properly excuse the employee's failure to
exhaust intra-union remedies if resort to such remedies would prove
futile.40
B. Role as a Prerequisite to an Employee's Section 301 Standing
To recover damages for a violation of a CBA, an employee must abide
by it.4 ' Therefore, if the CBA sets forth a grievance procedure, the em-
ployee first must seek reinstatement and lost wages using that proce-
misconduct, holding consistently that negligence, even when gross, is not enough to vio-
late the duty of fair representation. See Grant v. Burlington Indus., 832 F.2d 76, 80 (7th
Cir. 1987); Camacho v. Ritz-Carlton Water Tower, 786 F.2d 242, 244 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 3282 (1986); Dober v. Roadway Express, Inc., 707 F.2d 292, 294 (7th
Cir. 1983); Hoffman v. Lonza, Inc., 658 F.2d 519, 520 (7th Cir. 1981). See also Turner,
Intentional Misconduct and the Union's Duty of Fair Representation: The Seventh Cir-
cuit's Hoffman Standard, 63 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 43, 44 (1987) (intentional misconduct
standard may best accommodate rights of union, employer and employee).
37. See Joy, A Framework for Protection of Liberty, in American Labor Policy 190,
194 (C. Morris ed. 1987) (employee's heavy burden of proof serves to encourage collec-
tive bargaining and arbitration); Tobias, supra note 25, at 523 (employees face a "lonely,
uphill, and losing battle" in hybrid actions).
38. See, e.g., Sosbe v. Delco Elect. Div. of GMC, 830 F.2d 83, b6-87 (7th Cir. 1987);
Miller v. General Motors Corp., 675 F.2d 146, 150 (7th Cir. 1982); Curry v. Ford Motor
Co., 646 F. Supp. 261, 264 OV.D. Ky. 1983).
39. See, e.g., Clayton v. International Union, UAW, 451 U.S. 679, 689 (1981); NLRB
v. Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. 418, 428 (1968); Sosbe
v. Delco Elect. Div. of GMC, 830 F.2d 83, 86 (7th Cir. 1987).
40. See Clayton, 451 U.S. at 689 (court may excuse employee's failure to exhaust
internal union appeal if union hostility would prevent fair hearing, if internal union ap-
peals procedure would prove inadequate because it could not reactivate employee's griev-
ance or award complete relief, or if exhaustion would cause unreasonable delay). The
UAW, however, has successfully required exhaustion of internal union remedies because
its CBAs provide that the employer will allow the reactivation of an employee's grievance
when the employee has missed the filing deadline only as a result of his internal appeal to
the union. See Klein, Exhaustion of Internal Union Remedies After Clayton and Bowen,
in The Changing Law of Fair Representation 70, 76 (J. McKelvey ed. 1985).
Although courts often excuse an employee's failure to exhaust the grievance mecha-
nism provided in the union constitution, several commentators have criticized the re-
quirement's very existence. See Fox & Sonenthal, Section 301 and Exhaustion of Intra-
Union Appeals: A Misbegotten Marriage, 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 989, 1034 (1980); Tobias,
supra note 25, at 515. They argue that it is wrong to require exhaustion because the duty
of fair representation claim concerns the union-to-employee relationship, not the union-
to-union member relationship. See Tobias, supra note 25, at 515. Furthermore, because
the union constitution does not bind a non-member employee, an employee could clear
the exhaustion obstacle by not joining the union. See Soto Segarra v. Sea-Land Serv.,
Inc., 581 F.2d 291, 295 (1st Cir. 1978). Thus, the exhaustion requirement merely leads to
the disparate treatment of employees and penalizes those who join unions. See Fox &
Sonenthal, supra, at 1014-15.
41. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 184 (1967).
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dure.42  Courts generally respect the outcome of a CBA's grievance
procedure as final, unless they find that the union's breach of its duty of
fair representation undermined the integrity of the procedure.43 When a
union wields exclusive power to challenge the employer's conduct," the
employee must prove that the union breached its duty of fair representa-
tion as a threshold requirement within his hybrid action.45 When the
employee meets this requirement, he provjdes either an excuse for his
failure to exhaust the grievance procedure contained in the CBA46 or
grounds for a court's review of the decision reached in such a proce-
dure.4" Under such circumstances, courts are freed from their traditional
deference to the CBA scheme.4"
This threshold requirement stems from the federal labor policy prefer-
ence for private resolution, as espoused in section 203(d) of the Labor
Management Relations Act.4 9 The Act recognizes that industrial peace
42. See Clayton v. International Union, UAW, 451 U.S. 679, 686 n.l I(1981); Hines
v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 562-63 (1976); Vaca, 386 U.S. at 184; see
also supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
43. See Hines, 424 U.S. at 567; Del Casal v. Eastern Airlines, 634 F.2d 295, 299-300
(5th Cir. Unit B Jan.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 892 (1981).
44. See supra note 3. A union should exercise exclusive control over grievance proce-
dures because such control complements the union's status as exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative and provides the union with an opportunity to enhance its prestige among
employees. See Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 653 (1965).
Professor Cox argues that a union should have exclusive control over grievance proce-
dures because: (1) when a CBA violation has not injured an identifiable individual, the
union is the only party qualified to prosecute the claim; (2) the union must protect the
interests of the group by considering future implications of the resolution of a particular
grievance; (3) CBA violations often indirectly affect others than those filing a grievance;
(4) there is a greater likelihood that necessary uniformity of grievance resolution will
occur; (5) the union can prevent competition between rival employee groups; and (6)
when conflicting interests are at stake, the union's self-government is better than outside
arbitration. Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 601, 625-27 (1956).
45. See United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 62 (1981); Sanders v.
Youthcraft Coats and Suits, Inc., 700 F.2d 1226, 1231 (8th Cir. 1983); Cote v. Eagle
Stores, Inc., 688 F.2d 32, 35 (7th Cir. 1982) (per curiam), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1218
(1983). Courts should excuse this threshold requirement in certain circumstances. See
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 185 (1967). When the employer has repudiated the CBA, see
id., or when the CBA does not contain a grievance procedure, see Smith v. Evening News
Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 196 n. 1 (1962), employees need not prove that the union breached its
duty of fair representation before a court will review the employer's conduct under the
CBA. However, in these cases, the employee's § 301 action is not a hybrid claim.
46. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 185-86 (1967); supra note 43.
47. See United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 61 (1981); Hines v. Anchor
Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 567 (1976); Thomas v. Bakery, Confectionery and
Tobacco Workers Union Local No. 433, 826 F.2d 755, 763 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
56 U.S.L.W. 3569 (1988).
48. See cases cited supra note 43.
49. Ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136, 154 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1982)). Section
203(d) of the Labor Management Relations Act provides:
Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is hereby declared to
be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the
application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement. The
[Federal Mediation and Conciliation] Service is directed to make its conciliation
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depends upon labor and management settling their own differences.,'
With this freedom from excessive government intervention, unions and
employers create mechanisms to handle grievances that arise under
CBAs,5  tailoring grievance machinery to their own problems and needs.
Such procedures frequently provide for the resolution of problems at in-
formal levels before more elaborate arbitrations become necessary. 2
Under the Act, the parties must exhaust such procedures before they
may elicit federal court review.5 3
Labor experts concur in the congressional appraisal that grievance
procedures contained in CBAs offer a superior alternative to court pro-
ceedings. 4 This stems, in part, from the procedures' flexibility and low
cost.55 Grievance procedures also allow parties to resolve disputes more
quickly. 6 Moreover, such grievance mechanisms greatly reduce labor-
ers' need to seek resolution of their disputes through more drastic and
disruptive measures,5" such as strikes. The use of grievance procedures,
therefore, avoids industrial strife by establishing a labor-management
quid pro quo: the employer consents to adopt grievance mechanisms in
return for labor's inclusion of a "no strike" clause in the CBA.58 Because
and mediation services available in the settlement of such grievance disputes
only as a last resort and in exceptional cases.
Id.
50. See id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 171 (1982).
51. Most CBAs create a three- to five-step process in which exchanges take place
between increasingly higher-level labor and management representatives. The initial
stages are informal, and arbitration is invoked only as a last resort. Gould, supra note 25,
at 137-38; see Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 557 n.2 (1976) (five-
step process); Vaca, 386 U.S. 171, 175 n.3. (1967) (same); Robins, Unfair Dismissal
Emerging Issues in the Use of Arbitration As a Dispute Resolution Alternatiie for the Non-
union Workforce, 12 Fordham Urb. L.J. 437, 447 n.43 (1984) ("96% of all collective
bargaining agreements contain procedures for the settlement of disputes through mutual
discussion and arbitration"); Tidwell, supra note 3, at 384.
52. See supra note 51; see also Vaca, 386 U.S. at 191 (process allows for early termina-
tion of frivolous grievances).
53. 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1982). See United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363
U.S. 564, 566 (1960). "When the judiciary undertakes to determine the merits of a griev-
ance under the guise of interpreting the grievance procedure of collective bargaining
agreements, it usurps a function which under that regime is entrusted to the arbitration
tribunal." Id at 569. "The ablest judge cannot be expected to bring the same experience
and competence to bear upon the determination of a grievance [as can an arbitrator],
because he cannot be similarly informed." United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navi-
gation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960) (companion case).
54. See Edwards, The Duty of Fair Representation: A View from the Bench, in The
Changing Law of Fair Representation 93, 95 (J. McKelvey ed. 1985); Gould, supra note
25, at 137-40; Staudohar, Exhaustion of Remedies in Private Industry Grievance Proce-
dures, 7 Emp. Rel. L.J. 454, 455 (1982).
55. See Edwards, supra note 54, at 95.
56. See id; Gould, supra note 25, at 139; Staudohar, supra note 54, at 455.
57. See Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212, 225 (1983) (use of griev-
ance procedure avoids industrial strife); J. London, The Scab, in Revolution: Stories and
Essays 49 (compiled by R. Barltrop 1979) (strikes result in employer's use of scabs, to
which striking employees would naturally respond with violence).
58. See Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104-05 (1962) (when
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labor sacrifices its right to strike in exchange for this mechanism, the
grievance procedure must be enforced.59 Consistent with this congres-
sional scheme, the Supreme Court has held that an employee must at
least attempt to use the grievance procedure, thus allowing the union an
opportunity to act on his behalf,6" before personally suing the employer
in federal court.6 '
With this brief introduction to a union's duty of fair representation
and its role in hybrid actions, one may better understand that an em-
ployee should recover attorney's fees from his union even when his em-
ployer has not violated the CBA.
II. ATTORNEY'S FEES SHOULD BE RECOVERABLE EVEN WHEN THE
EMPLOYER HAS NOT VIOLATED THE COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENT
In a hybrid action, an employee must prove that the union's breach of
its duty of fair representation has frustrated his right to recover on a
valid claim against the employer before a court can award back pay.62
The question then arises whether a court may award attorney's fees when
the court finds that the union has breached its duty but that the employer
did not violate the CBA. Several federal courts of appeals have held that
fairness requires such a recovery.63
Courts that allow recovery of attorney's fees when the union has
CBA contains grievance procedure, no-strike clause is implied); Textile Workers Union
v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957) ("the entire tenor of the [Labor Management
Relations Act's] history indicates that the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes was
considered as quid pro quo of a no-strike agreement").
59. See Textile Workers Union, 353 U.S. at 454, (CBA clauses forcing employers to
arbitrate enforceable in federal courts).
60. See Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652-53 (1965).
61. This requirement is rooted, in part, in the rationale behind the existence of
unions:
[T]hey [are] organized out of the necessities of the situation; that a single em-
ployee [is] helpless in dealing with an employer; that he [is] dependent ordina-
rily on his daily wage for the maintenance of himself and family; that if the
employer refuse[s] to pay him the wages he [thinks] fair, he [is] nevertheless
unable to leave the employ and resist arbitrary and unfair treatment; that union
[is] essential to give laborers opportunity to deal on an equality with their
employer.
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937). Similarly, Professor
Oberer notes that, by definition, "[a] free society is one the rules of which allow the
collectivizing of individual weakness into organized strength for the sake of countering a
power center of otherwise incontestable proportions." Oberer, The Regulation of Union
Economic Power, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 267, 268-69.
62. See United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 73 n.2 (1981); Hines v.
Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 570-71 (1976); San Francisco Web Pressmen
and Platemakers' Union No.4 v. NLRB, 794 F.2d 420, 424-25 (9th Cir. 1986).
63. See Web Pressmen, 794 F.2d at 423; Dutrisac v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 749 F.2d
1270, 1275-76 (9th Cir. 1983); Del Casal v. Eastern Airlines, 634 F.2d 295, 301 (5th Cir.
Unit B Jan.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 892 (1981); Self v. Drivers, Chauffeurs, Warehouse-
men & Helpers Local Union No. 61, 620 F.2d 439, 444 (4th Cir. 1980).
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breached its duty of fair representation but the employer has not violated
the CBA conclude that union breaches cause employees to suffer dam-
ages whether or not the employer violated the CBA.' They contend
that because the union wrongfully refused to present the grievance, or
did so in a wrongful manner, the union denied the employee the opportu-
nity to have his grievance properly heard, forcing the employee to seek
substitute representation.65 These courts often rely upon the Supreme
Court's decision in Vaca v. Sipes.66 In Vaca, a hybrid action, the Court
never reached the attorney's fees issue because the employee failed to
prove a breach by the union.67 The Court nevertheless indicated that
had the employee prevailed in his wrongful discharge claim against the
employer, the liability for damages should have been shared by the em-
ployer and the union according to the injury each caused." Courts that
allow the recovery of fees find that attorney's fees accurately reflect the
damage to employees caused by negligent or othervise wrongful union
conduct.
69
The same rationale that justifies recovery of attorney's fees where the
employer has violated the CBA and the union has breached its duty also
justifies recovery of attorney's fees in the absence of a violation of the
CBA by the employer.7" Whenever the possibility reasonably exists that
64. In Dutrisac, a union's failure to file a timely request for arbitration precluded an
employee's grievance against his employer. 749 F.2d at 1274. In the subsequent hybrid
action, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that even though the employer
had not violated the CBA, the union was liable for the attorney's fees that the employee
incurred in his nonfrivolous suit against the employer. Id. at 1275-76. The court stressed
that it did not award attorney's fees per se, but rather awarded attorney's fees as damages
suffered by the employee as a result of the union's breach. Id. at 1276.
In San Francisco Web Pressmen and Platemakers' Union No.4 v. NLRB, 794 F.2d 420
(9th Cir. 1986), the court enforced a NLRB order that permitted an employee to hire
private counsel at the union's expense for the remainder of his grievance procedure. See
id. at 423. Following the lead of the Dutrisac decision, the court awarded attorney's fees
but refused to award back pay because the employer had not violated the CBA. Id. at
423-24.
65. See Web Pressman, 794 F.2d at 423; Dutrisac, 749 F.2d at 1275-76; Del Casal v.
Eastern Airlines, 634 F.2d 295, 301 (5th Cir. Unit B Jan.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 892
(1981); Self v. Drivers, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers Local Union No. 61, 620
F.2d 439, 444 (4th Cir. 1980).
66. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
67. See id. at 194-95.
68. See id at 197.
69. See Del Casal v. Eastern Airlines, 634 F.2d 295, 301-02 (5th Cir. Unit B Jan.),
cerL denied, 454 U.S. 892 (1981); Self v. Drivers, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers
Local Union No. 61, 620 F.2d 439, 444 (4th Cir. 1980).
70. Courts that allow recovery of attorney's fees when the employer has violated the
CBA rely on SupremeCourt dictum in one of two cases. See Zuniga v. United Can Co.,
812 F.2d 443, 455 (9th Cir. 1987) (court adopted Supreme Court's reasoning in Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42 (1979), which established
that unfair representation suits were designed to compensate employees for injuries
caused by violation of their rights by unions); Seymour v. Olin Corp., 666 F.2d 202, 214
(5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (court allowed recovery of attorney's fees from union, recognizing
that award of attorney's fees and costs against union was a fair measure of the "difficulty
and expense of collecting" from employer (quoting Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25, 29
1987]
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the employer violated the CBA, the union has an obligation to fairly rep-
resent the employee.7' The absence of a CBA violation, therefore, does
not bear on the employee's right to recover attorney's fees.72
Although in hybrid actions the claim against the employer and the
claim against the union are closely related, the two claims may be sepa-
rated for purposes of apportioning damages liability. 3 The Court in
Vaca concluded that a court may find that the union breached its duty
and caused damage to the employee without also finding that the em-
ployer violated the CBA.74 It follows that when such circumstances ex-
ist, the union should be liable for any damage it causes employees.
Courts have found that employees suffer loss in the form of fees paid to
such privately-retained attorneys because the wrongful conduct of the
unions effectively forces employees to retain private counsel.7s
Courts that deny any recovery by an employee unless the employee
proves both that the union breached its duty and that the employer vio-
lated the CBA reason that "the two claims are inextricably interdepen-
dent ' 76 with respect to damages recoverable by employees.77 In support
of their position, these courts place mistaken primary reliance 78 on
(1970))); Soto Segarra v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 581 F.2d 291, 298 (1st Cir. 1978) (also
relying on Czosek); Scott v. Local Union 377, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 548 F.2d 1244,
1246 (6th Cir.) (per curiam) (same), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 968 (1977).
71. Though the employee does not have an absolute right to have his grievance pur-
sued, the union may not refuse representation discriminatorily, arbitrarily, or in bad
faith. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190-91 (1967).
72. See United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 73 (1981) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part); supra note 65.
73. See Mitchell, 451 U.S. at 73.
[T]o prevail against the union, the employee must prove that the union
breached its duty of fair representation and, if he wishes to recover loss-of-em-
ployment damages for which the union is responsible, that the employer
breached the agreement. However, despite this close relationship, the two
claims are not inseparable.
Id. at n.2 (citations omitted). "The determination whether the employer breached the
agreement may be highly relevant to the amount of damages caused by the union's al-
leged breach of duty, but it is not necessarily controlling with respect to the threshold
question whether there was any breach of duty by the union at all." Id. at n.4.
74. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 196 (1967). In dictum, the Court remarked that
one possible remedy for the union's breach was to order the union to arbitrate the em-
ployee's grievance. Id. Thus, the Court could determine that the union breached without
first determining that the CBA had been violated.
75. See supra note 65.
76. United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 66-67 (1981) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
77. See Bagsby v. Lewis Bros., Inc., 820 F.2d 799, 801 (6th Cir. 1987); Wood v,
International Bhd. of Teamsters, 807 F.2d 493, 502 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 3232 (1987); Foster v. United Steelworkers, 752 F.2d 1533, 1534 (1 1th Cir. 1985).
78. See Bagsby, 820 F.2d at 801 (relying on Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424
U.S. 554, 570-71 (1976)); Wood, 807 F.2d at 502 (relying on Hines, 424 U.S. at 570-71,
and United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 62 (1981)); Foster, 752 F.2d at
1534 (relying on DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164-65
(1983)).
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Supreme Court dictum in Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc 9 and its
progeny."0 In Hines, the Court stated that to prevail under the CBA
against either the employer or the union, the employee "must not only
show that [the] discharge was contrary to the contract but must also
carry the burden of demonstrating breach of duty by the [u]nion."''
These courts extend this language to bar recovery of attorney's fees as
well.8"
The Supreme Court in Hines, however, concerned itself only with
79. 424 U.S. 554, 570-71 (1976).
80. Subsequent to the Hines decision, the Court considered two hybrid actions deter-
mining the correct statute of limitations to be applied to such actions. In United Parcel
Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56 (1981), Justice Stewart, concurring, repeated the
Hines quote, prefacing it with the statement that the claims against the employer and the
union are "inextricably interdependent." Id at 66-67. In DelCostello v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983), the Court quoted Mitchell's preface and
the Hines language and concluded that "[t]he employee may, if he chooses, sue one de-
fendant and not the other; but the case he must prove is the same whether he sues one,
the other, or both." DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 164-65.
Although courts that deny recovery of attorney's fees rely on these cases, their hold-
ings do not control because they relate only to the proper statute of limitations in hybrid
actions, not to whether attorney's fees are recoverable in the absence of a CBA violation.
See id. at 154-55; Mitchell, 451 U.S. at 58.
81. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 570-71 (1976).
82. See Bagsby v. Lewis Bros., Inc., 820 F.2d 799, 801 (6th Cir. 1987); Wood v.
International Bhd. of Teamsters, 807 F.2d 493, 503 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 3232 (1987); see also Foster v. United Steelworkers, 752 F.2d 1533, 1534 (11 th Cir.
1985) (following DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983),
court held it could not enforce the order against union to pay employee's attorney's fees if
lower court determined the employer had not violated CBA).
A trio of cases from the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit illustrates the error
involved in such an extension. In Wood v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 807
F.2d 493, 503 (6th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 3232 (1987), the court declined to
follow the holdings of other courts of appeals allowing recovery, reasoning that because
the union is intended to serve as the exclusive agent of the employees, the "employees
should be discouraged from pursuing their claims independently." Id. at 503. In addi-
tion to its reliance on Hines and Mitchell, the court also relied on Badon v. General
Motors Corp., 679 F.2d 93 (6th Cir. 1982), which held that it was against '"sound judi-
cial policy to encourage actions to recover only the costs of litigation where no underly-
ing right can any longer be vindicated in the action.'" Wood, 807 F.2d at 503 (quoting
Badon, 679 F.2d at 98).
This reliance on the Badon decision is misguided. The Badon court inserted the lan-
guage quoted by the Wood court as an argument in favor of the application of the same
statute of limitations to duty of fair representation claims as to CBA claims. See Badon,
679 F.2d at 98. The Badon court reasoned that if duty of fair representation claims have
a longer statute of limitations than CBA claims, it would be possible for an employee to
sue his union after his suit against his employer was time-barred. See id. Unlike typical
hybrid actions, in which the employees with non-frivolous claims reasonably can expect
to recover, such time-barred suits should be discouraged because the employee knows
from the start of the action that he cannot recover from his employer. In hybrid actions,
the employee has every reason to believe that he will prevail against both defendants.
In Bagsby v. Lewis Bros., Inc., 820 F.2d 799 (6th Cir. 1987), the court held that Hines,
not the American rule, prevented the award of attorney's fees from the union unless the




damages recoverable under the CBA.s3 First, the Supreme Court merely
reemphasized the duty of fair representation's role as a threshold ques-
tion.84 Further, the Court recognized the self-evident; even if the em-
ployee has met this threshold, the employee could only collect damages
for a CBA violation if the employer violated the CBA.85 Reliance on the
Hines language by courts opposing attorney's fees recovery from unions,
therefore, is misplaced. Because the present controversy concerns recov-
ery for damages caused by the union's breach of its duty of fair represen-
tation, and not damages recoverable under the CBA, Hines does not
apply.
In addition to the separability of claims argument, a comparison of
hybrid actions to ordinary legal malpractice actions also reveals that a
union's breach of its duty results in damage to the employee even without
a CBA violation by his employer. In legal malpractice actions, a plain-
tiff's cause of action depends upon his demonstration that, but for the
attorney's negligence, he would have received a more favorable result in
the litigation in which he was represented by the attorney. 86 For exam-
ple, if the plaintiff proves that the attorney's negligence prevented recov-
ery, the plaintiff's damages would then consist of the value of that lost
claim.87
In both legal malpractice claims and duty of fair representation claims
brought in hybrid actions, courts award damages caused by a representa-
tive's wrongful conduct. 88 In attorney malpractice actions, damages con-
sist of the value of the lost claim.8 9 In hybrid actions, however, the
employee has not lost his claim against the employer. The union's
breach, rather than extinguishing his claim, has only made it more diffi-
cult to vindicate. The employee must engage legal counsel to fulfill the
union's breached obligation.9" Thus, when the employer has violated the
CBA, the union is liable for both its portion of back pay and the attor-
ney's fees incurred by the employee in suing the employer.9 ' When the
employer has not violated the CBA, so that back pay is not available, the
employee still should be entitled to recover attorney's fees incurred as a
83. See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 570-71 (1976).
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See R. Mallen & V. Levit, Legal Malpractice § 551, at 675-76 (2d ed. 1981).
87. See id. § 552, at 676-77, § 557, at 690-92.
88. The union representative is not a lawyer and cannot be expected to meet the same
standards of conduct. See Early v. Eastern Transfer, 699 F.2d 552, 557 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 824 (1983). However, once the respective breaches have been estab-
lished (that the union breached its duty and that the attorney committed malpractice),
the primary differences cease to exist and the two actions are analogous. See United
Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 74 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (statute of limitations for legal malpractice actions should be applied
to employee suits against union for breach of its duty of fair representation).
89. See Stewart v. Hall, 770 F.2d 1267, 1269 (4th Cir. 1985); Williams v. Bashman,
457 F. Supp. 322, 326 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
90. See supra note 65.
91. See supra notes 17-18.
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result of the union's wrongful conduct.92 Unlike legal malpractice
claims, the employees in hybrid actions incur additional attorney's fees
precisely because of the hybrid nature of the action. The union's wrong-
doing forces the employee to obtain private counsel in an attempt to re-
solve his CBA claim against the employer. These attorney's fees should
be recoverable without regard to whether the employer wrongfully dis-
charged the employee.
Opponents may contend that allowing recovery of attorney's fees ab-
sent a violation of the CBA will undermine the union's discretion to sift
out frivolous grievances. Opponents may fear that unions defensively
will pursue all grievances to avoid the costly possibility of later chal-
lenges, overwhelming the grievance process.93 Admittedly, union discre-
tion serves an essential role in the proper functioning of the collective
bargaining system.94 Unions must have the ability to promote settlement
and avoid processing frivolous claims. This argument, however, merely
provides a rationale for a lower standard of care for union conduct.
Adoption of a lower standard of care simultaneously satisfies both
union and employee interests. By requiring a union to have acted with
gross negligence or wrongful discrimination before finding a breach of
the duty of fair representation, 95 courts can ensure that union discretion
remains intact. If the union truly believes that an employee's grievance
lacks merit, its failure to pursue the employee's claim will not constitute
a breach of its duty.96 A breach occurs when the union has acted dis-
criminatorily and has failed to exercise any discretion in evaluating the
claim's merit.97 In such a case, allowing recovery of attorney's fees will
encourage unions to exercise discretion-not prevent it. Allowing the
recovery of fees absent a CBA violation, therefore, will act as a mecha-
nism to keep unions honest. Such awards will ensure that unions faith-
fully perform their legal obligations in the administration of grievance
processes.
Opponents further may suggest that holding unions liable for attor-
ney's fees incurred by employees when the union breaches its duty of fair
representation but the employer did not violate the CBA will force a
change in unions' long-standing tradition of popularity-contest elec-
92. See supra note 65.
93. See Kopp, The Duty of Fair Representation Revisited, 5 Emp. Rel L.J. 3, 12
(1979); Rabin, The Duty of Fair Representation in Arbitration, in The Duty of Fair Repre-
sentation 84, 85-86 (J. McKelvey ed. 1977); Waldman, A Union Advocate's View, in The
Changing Law of Fair Representation 109, 111-12 (J. McKelvey ed. 1985).
94. See International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 51 (1979); Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967).
95. See supra note 36.
96. When the union believes in good faith that a grievance lacks merit, the union has
a duty not to pursue the grievance. See Sanders v. Youthcraft Coats and Suits, Inc., 700
F.2d 1226, 1229 (8th Cir. 1983); Bazarte v. United Transp. Union, 429 F.2d 868, 872 (3d
Cir. 1970); Faust v. RCA Corp., 657 F. Supp. 614, 621 (M.D. Pa. 1986). See also supra
notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
97. See supra note 96.
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tions. 98 Because the position of shopsteward would require more exper-
tise,9 9 union membership would be forced to elect representatives who
would be less likely to process claims negligently or in bad faith."o Ad-
mittedly, aggrieved employees are more likely to approach a steward
whom they like. An emphasis on expertise, as well as popularity, how-
ever, would not ruin union democracy. In addition to popularity and
membership support the steward should possess sufficient expertise to
handle grievances, once approached. When the union's gross negligence
or discriminatory tactics preclude a wrongfully discharged employee's
reinstatement, that employee takes little solace in his steward's popular-
ity and accessability. Rather, the election of competent representation
would invite union members to become more integrally involved in the
administration of their rights under a CBA.10'
While allowing recovery might weaken unions to a certain extent by
depleting funds, the financial strength of unions is not the paramount
goal of labor legislation. Union honesty and the effectiveness of unions
as representative bodies also occupy positions of vital importance.
10 2
Unions have an obligation to expend union funds, whether in properly
processing a grievance claim or in paying damages for breaching their
duty to represent an employee fairly.
The justifications favoring recovery of attorney's fees form a weighty,
persuasive argument. They demonstrate that union breaches cause em-
ployees to suffer damages regardless of CBA violations by the employer.
98. Vladeck, The Conflict Between the Duty of Fair Representation and the Linita-
tions on Union Self-Government, in The Duty of Fair Representation 44, 45 (J. McKelvey
ed. 1977).
Courts repeatedly have protected an employee's right to hold union office without hav-
ing to meet unreasonable qualifications. See, e.g., Local 3489, United Steelworkers v.
Usery, 429 U.S. 305, 312-13 (1977) (striking down candidacy requirement that member
have attended at least one-half of local meetings for the three years prior to election);
Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel & Club Employees Union, Local 6, 391 U.S. 492, 500-05 (1968)
(striking down candidacy requirement that member hold or have previously held some
elective office); Donovan v. Local Union No. 120, 683 F.2d 1095, 1102-04 (7th Cir. 1982)
(striking down candidacy requirement that member be "competent to perform the duties
of the office for which he is a candidate").
These courts have concluded that "open democratic elections, unfettered by arbitrary
exclusions" offer the best means to the election of knowledgeable and dedicated leaders.
Usery, 429 U.S. at 312. See Wirtz, 391 U.S. at 496; Donovan, 683 F.2d at 1102. Members
therefore remain free to elect inexperienced, unqualified candidates. See also Waldman,
supra note 93, at 111-12 (pointing out inconsistency between courts imposing higher stan-
dards in duty of fair representation cases and courts not allowing union election require-
ments that will ensure the election of representatives capable of meeting these higher
standards).
99. See Vladeck, supra note 98, at 45.
100. See Vladeck, supra note 98, at 44-46 (expressing concern whether any union
member possesses the ability to interpret CBAs or level of literacy needed to present
grievances adequately).
101. See Tobias, supra note 25, at 510-11 (citing employees' recent awareness and pro-
tection of their rights provided by CBA).
102. See Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel & Club Employees Union, Local 6, 391 U.S. 492, 497
(1968).
ATTORNEY'S FEES UNDER SECTION 301
The arguments offered against recovery fail to convince because, in every
case, either an effective counterargument or more reasonable compro-
mise exists.
CONCLUSION
Federal labor policy acknowledges that, under the collective bargain-
ing system, some individuals must make sacrifices so that the whole may
gain."03 This policy, however, does not require an employee to withstand
wrongful conduct by his union without compensation for the injury such
conduct causes. When a union breaches its duty of fair representation,
the group does not gain by the harm suffered by the individual employee.
Although denial of recovery of attorney's fees absent an employer breach
of the CBA will leave more money in the union's treasury and, therefore,
give the union a greater ability to represent the workers, the union will
have exercised this ability wrongfully and to the detriment of all. In the
process, the union has undermined the collective bargaining system and
has become a barrier to, rather than a conduit for, the vindication of
worker's rights. All employees will view the union's conduct with resig-
nation, knowing they cannot rely on their union to represent them fairly.
For the reasons given, courts should allow the recovery of attorney's
fees for a union's breach of its duty of fair representation in the absence
of an employer's CBA violation. The award of such fees as damages will
properly compensate employees and promote fair collective bargaining.
Joseph J. Vitale
103. See J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 339 (1944). In J.L Case, the Court
found an individual's employment contract subordinate to the collective bargaining unit's
CBA and incapable of waiving any benefits secured by the CBA. Under a collective
bargaining system, any advantage that could have been secured by an individual instead
will remain with the union as a contribution to the collective result. Id.
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